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IPSE D IXIT AT THE I.C.J.

Professor Sean D. Murphy
George Washington University
smurphy@law.gwu.edu
(draft paper forthcoming Volume 99:1 of the
American Journal of International Law (2005))

In October 2003, the Israeli permanent representative addressed the UN General Assembly
on why Israel felt compelled to build a lengthy barrier spanning hundreds of kilometers across certain
areas of the West Bank. Among other things, Ambassador Dan Gillerman stated:

[A] security fence has proven itself to be one of the most effective non-violent methods for
preventing terrorism in the heart of civilian areas. The fence is a measure wholly consistent
with the right of States to self-defence enshrined in Article 51 of the Charter. International
law and Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001),
have clearly recognized the right of States to use force in self-defence against terrorist
attacks, and therefore surely recognize the right to use non-forcible measures to that end.1

Ambassador Gillerman noted that the factual and legal basis for Israel’s position had “been set forth
in numerous Israeli statements before the [Security] Council and this Assembly, in countless letters
to the Secretary General and in a variety of publicly available materials and official statements.”2

1
2

UN Doc. A/ES-10/PV.21 at 6 (Oct. 21, 2003).
Id.

2
In its advisory opinion of July 2004, the International Court considered and disposed of this
legal basis for the construction of the Israeli barrier in a single paragraph. After quoting Article 51
of the UN Charter,3 the Court stated:

Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the existence of an inherent right of selfdefence in the case of armed attack by one State against another State. However, Israel does
not claim that the attacks against it are imputable to a foreign state.

The Court also notes that Israel exercises control in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory and that, as Israel itself states, the threat which it regards as justifying the
construction of the wall originates within, and not outside, that territory. The situation is thus
different from that contemplated by Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373
(2001), and therefore Israel could not in any event invoke those resolutions in support of its
claim to be exercising a right of self-defence.

Consequently, the Court concludes that Article 51 has no relevance in this case.4

3

Article 51 provides in part: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security.” UN CHARTER Art. 51.
4

Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, para. 139 (July 9, 2004), reprinted in 43 ILM 1009 (2004) [hereinafter Legal
Consequences Advisory Opinion].

3
The position taken by the Court with respect to the jus ad bellum is startling in its brevity
and, upon analysis, very unsatisfactory. At best, the position represents imprecise drafting, and thus
calls into question whether the advisory opinion process necessarily helps the Court “to develop its
jurisprudence and to contribute to the progress of international law.”5 At worst, the position conflicts
with the language of the UN Charter, its travaux préparatoires, the practice of states and
international organizations, and common sense. In addition to the lack of cogent analytical reasoning,
the Court’s unwillingness to pursue a serious inquiry into the facts underlying Israel’s legal position
highlights a disquieting aspect of the Court’s institutional capabilities: an apparent inability to
grapple with complex fact patterns associated with armed conflict. Overall, the Court’s peremptory
style in addressing the jus ad bellum reflects an unfortunate ipse dixit approach to judicial reasoning;
the Court apparently expects others to accept an important interpretation of the law and facts simply
because the Court says it is so.

I. THE SCOPE OF UN CHARTER ARTICLE 51

The Court’s finding that “Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the existence of an
inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State against another State” might
be regarded as ambiguous. The Court did not expressly state that Article 51 only recognizes selfdefense by a state against another state. Perhaps the Court was simply recognizing that a state may

5

Speech by H.E. Judge Shi Jiuyong, President of the International Court of Justice, to the
Sixth Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, The Advisory Function of the
International Court of Justice (Nov. 5, 2004), at <http://www.icj-cij.org>.

4
self-defend against another state as one type of self-defense that arises under Article 51.6 To the
extent that any further implication is drawn from the language, one might just ascribe such
implication to imprecise drafting on the part of the Court.
There are two problems, however, with such an interpretation of the Court’s finding. First,
Israel directly asserted that it was invoking a right of self-defense as permitted under Article 51
against non-state terrorist attacks, and in the paragraph prior to its finding, the Court recognized that
assertion.7 This context thus strongly indicates that the Court considered the Israeli position that it
was engaging in self-defense under Article 51 against a non-state actor and rejected that position on
the ground that Article 51 only contemplates self-defense by a state against another state. Second,
the Court was well-aware that its position would be interpreted as excluding self-defense against
non-state actors, since two of the judges objected to the Court’s position on that basis. In her separate
opinion, Judge Higgins interpreted the Court as saying that “self-defence is available only when an
armed attack is made by a State.”8 In his declaration in dissent, Judge Buergenthal stated that the
Court’s position was problematic because Article 51, in affirming the inherent right of self-defense,
“does not make its exercise dependent upon an armed attack by another State.”9
Assuming that these views were made known to the Court in the course of the Court’s

6

See Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, para. 35, Legal Consequences Advisory
Opinion, supra note 4 (“Although this statement is undoubtedly correct, as a reply to Israel’s
argument it is, with all due respect, beside the point.”).
7

Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, para. 138.

8

Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, para. 33, Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion,
supra note 4.
9

Declaration of Judge Buergenthal, para. 6, Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion,
supra note 4.

5
deliberations, as would normally be the case, the Court was well-aware of how its language was
going to be interpreted and nevertheless chose to adopt that interpretation.10 Unfortunately, the Court
provided no analysis of why Article 51 was restricted to armed attacks by states even though, for
several reasons, analysis was merited.
The ordinary meaning of Article 51. First, there is nothing in the language of Article 51 of
the Charter that requires the exercise of self-defense to turn on whether an armed attack was
committed directly by, or can be imputed to, another state. Article 51 speaks of the right of selfdefense by a “Member of the United Nations” against an armed attack without any qualification as
to who or what is conducting the armed attack. Looking at the “ordinary meaning” of the terms of
Article 51,11 there is no basis for reading into the text a restriction on who the attacker must be.
10

The Court obviously was unwilling to regard Palestine as a “state” for purposes of
Article 51, which is consistent with the fact that Palestine is not a member of the United Nations.
However, the Court’s treatment of Palestine throughout the proceedings (allowing it to make
written and oral submissions), and in much of the Court’s jus in bello analysis, appears to regard
Palestine as the functional equivalent of a state. Thus, the Court was comfortable regarding the
West Bank and Gaza strip as sufficiently close to being territory of a foreign state for purposes of
applying the Fourth Geneva Convention, going so far as to note that the territory was part of
Jordan at one time and that Jordan and Israel were parties to the Geneva Conventions when the
1967 armed conflict broke out. See Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, para.
101. Yet the Court refrained from regarding such territory as sufficiently close to being the
territory of a foreign state for purposes of applying a different treaty, the UN Charter, to which
Jordan and Israel were also parties as of 1967. Only with respect to the jus ad bellum argument
does Palestine’s formal position as a non-state seem to become a dispositive factor for the Court.
Giving Palestine a quasi-state status for purposes of appearing before the Court and for
purposes of applying certain treaties that operate as between states, but not for other treaties,
results in an unexplained double-standard. If Palestine were regarded as the functional equivalent
of a state for purposes of Article 51, Israel presumably would impute many of the terrorist attacks
to that “state.” See Written Statement of Israel, para. 3.76 (Jan. 29, 2004), Legal Consequences
Advisory Opinion, supra note 4 (stating that the “evidence of attribution, of commission and
omission, [of terrorist acts to Palestine] is great”).
11

See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, Art. 31(1), 1155 UNTS
331, 340 [hereinafter VCLT] (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the

6
Indeed, reading the language in context12 leads to the same conclusion. If one compares the language
used in Article 2(4) of the Charter (which speaks of a use of force by one “Member” against “any
state”),13 one finds that the same construct is not repeated in Article 51. Rather, Article 51 is silent
on who or what might commit an armed attack justifying self-defense.
Certainly the reasoning underlying this paragraph could not have been that the Charter only
regulates relations among states. The Charter expressly speaks to the relations of states to non-state
actors14 and the Security Council has repeatedly found that the conduct of non-state actors can be a
threat to international peace and security under Chapter VII of the Charter.15 The Court itself saw
Article 2(4) (which speaks expressly of action by states against states) as “relevant” law with respect
to Israel’s conduct in the “Occupied Palestinian Territory,”16 even though the Court saw no such
relevance for Article 51 (which is not expressly limited to states) with respect to the exact same
Israeli conduct.

ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object
and purpose.”). The Court has invoked this provision of the Vienna Convention on many
occasions, including in its advisory opinion. See Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion, supra
note 4, para. 94.
12

VCLT, supra note 11, Art. 31(1).

13

UN CHARTER Art. 2(4).

14

UN CHARTER pmbl., Arts. 55-56.

15

See S.C. Res. 1540, pmbl. (Apr. 28, 2004) (acting under Chapter VII to address
terrorism “and the risk that non-State actors” may acquire weapons of mass destruction); S.C.
Res. 1566, para. 1 (Oct. 8, 2004); S.C. Res. 1373, pmbl. (Sept. 28, 2001); S.C. Res. 1377, annex,
pmbl. (Nov. 12, 2001); see also S.C. Res. 1070, pmbl. (Aug. 16, 1996); S.C. Res. 731, pmbl.
(Jan. 21, 1992). The Security Council has defined a “non-State actor” as an “individual or entity,
not acting under the lawful authority of any State . . . .” S.C. Res. 1540, supra, at footnote.
16

Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, paras. 86-87.

7
The “inherent right” of self-defense. Second, to understand the full meaning of “selfdefense” in Article 51 requires looking beyond the language of Article 51 alone. As the Court itself
has recognized, Article 51 did not create a right of self-defense; rather, it preserved an inherent right
of self-defense, one that existed in customary international law prior to enactment of the Charter in
1945.17 The Court has repeatedly stated that we must look to this customary international law rule
to ascertain the full content of Article 51. Thus, in determining that the principles of necessity and
proportionality apply to the exercise of the right of self-defense under Article 51, the Court has relied
upon the existence of those principles in customary international law, since they do not appear
anywhere in the text of Article 51.18
Yet when considering the principles of necessity and proportionality under customary

17

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 ICJ
14, para. 193 (Judgment of June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua Judgment] (“Article 51 is only
meaningful on the basis that there is a “natural” or “inherent” right of self-defence, and it is hard
to see how this can be other than of a customary nature, even if its present content has been
confirmed and influenced by the Charter.”).
18

See id., para. 176; Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 ICJ 66, para. 41 [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion]; Oil Platforms
(Iran v. U.S.), 2003 ICJ 161, para. 51 (Nov. 6) [hereinafter Oil Platforms Judgment] (“The
United States must also show that its actions were necessary and proportional to the armed attack
made on it”).

8
international law, the precedent that immediately comes to the mind of states,19 scholars,20 and
presumably International Court judges21 is the 1837 Caroline incident. In that clash between the
United States and the United Kingdom, the two governments settled upon the basic contours of the
right of self-defense,22 contours that remain today the touchstone for most discourse on the subject.
On its facts, the Caroline incident concerned self-defense as a reaction to attacks by non-state actors
(in that case, support by U.S. nationals for a rebellion in Canada).23 Governments prior to the UN
Charter invoked the right of self-defense against the acts of individuals in numerous cases, such as

19

See, e.g., Memorial Submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran, para. 4.18 (June 8,
1993), Oil Platforms Judgment, supra note 18 (“This condition of lawful self-defence was
reflected in the statement by U.S. Secretary of State Webster, in the celebrated Caroline case,
regarded as the locus classicus of the customary right of self-defence.”); Counter-Memorial and
Counter-Claim Submitted by the United States of America, paras. 4.43-4.44 (June 23, 1997), Oil
Platforms Judgment, supra note 18 (“Webster’s analysis established the requirements of
necessity and proportionality as cornerstones of the legal doctrine of self-defense.”).
20

See, e.g., MALCOLM SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1024 (5th ed. 2003) (“The traditional
definition of the right of self-defence in customary international law occurs in the Caroline
case,”); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 120 (2d ed. 2004) (“The
requirements of necessity and proportionality are often traced back to the 1837 Caroline incident
. . . .”).
21

See, e.g., Nicaragua Judgment, supra note 17, at 362, para. 200 (dissenting opinion of
Judge Schwebel).
22

See 29 BRITISH & FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1226, 1137-38 (1857); 30 BRITISH &
FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 193, 195 (1858) (exchange of letters between the United
States and United Kingdom); see R.Y. Jennings, The Caroline and McLeod Cases, 32 AJIL 82,
89 (1938).
23

The incident involved a U.K. assertion that its attack in U.S. territory on the schooner
Caroline was permissible self-defense because the schooner had previously been used (and might
be used again) to ferry supplies across the border to Canada to rebels who were fighting U.K. rule
in Canada. In support of his views, Webster cited to eminent scholars of international law
regarding the status of international custom, including Grotius, Pufendorf, and Vattel.
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seizure of vessels engaged in smuggling.24
This inherent right of self defense is preserved under Article 51 “if an armed attack occurs.”
In the Nicaragua case, the Court found that, in establishing that an “armed attack” has occurred, the
state invoking a right of self-defense must establish that it has been the target of a large-scale use of
force, such as an invasion or a bombardment or other “most grave forms of the use of force.”25
Moreover, the Court found that such force could occur either through the use of regular armed forces
or by “the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries.”26
However, if a state simply provides weapons or logistical support to a non-state actor, which in turn
uses force against a second state, such action does not constitute an “armed attack” by the first state
within the meaning of Article 51, and therefore the second state has no right to self-defend against
the first state.27 The Court did not directly address whether the second state could engage in “counterintervention,”28 nor whether the second state could regard the actions of a non-state actor as an

24

See, e.g., C.H.M. Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in
International Law, 81 R.C.A.D.I. 455, 464-66 (1952-II).
25

See Nicaragua Judgment, supra note 17, para. 191 (“it will be necessary to distinguish
the most grave forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less
grave forms”); Oil Platforms Judgment, supra note 18, para. 51; see also I THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 796 (Bruno Simma, ed. 2d ed. 2002) (noting that “armed
attacks” must be “military actions [that] are on a certain scale and have a major effect, and are
thus not to be considered mere frontier incidents”); YORAM DINSTEIN , WAR, AGGRESSION AND
SELF-DEFENCE 173-74 (3d ed. 2001) (“There is no doubt that, for an illegal use of force to
acquire the dimensions of an armed attack, a minimal threshold has to be reached. . . . In the
absence of an armed attack, self-defence is not an option available to the victim State . . . .).
26

See Nicaragua Judgment, supra note 17, para. 195.

27

Id.

28

Id., paras. 210-11.
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“armed attack,” nor clarify whether it makes a difference if the non-state actor operates solely within
the second state.29
The Court’s finding in Nicaragua was criticized at the time by members of the Court30 and
remains controversial today,31 since it suggests that what states cannot do directly (send military
forces into another state), it can do indirectly by providing weapons and other assistance to non-state
actors who it knows will pursue the same objective. The Court’s advisory opinion appears to take
this restrictive interpretation of Article 51 to a further level, by expressly stating that the second state
cannot regard the actions of the non-state actor as an “armed attack” justifying a use of force against
the non-state-actor’s camps or hide-outs located across a border. While the Court’s opinion would
allow such a defensive response if the non-state actor’s conduct can be “imputed” to the first state,
29

In the Nicaragua case, El Salvador asserted to the Court, among other things, that
Nicaragua was providing “houses, hideouts and communication facilities” to the insurgents
(“terrorists”) that were attacking El Salvador. Nicaragua Judgment, supra note 17, para. 132. The
Court found that until early 1981, “an intermittent flow of arms was routed via the territory of
Nicaragua to the armed opposition in El Salvador” without reaching any specific findings as to
how much insurgent activity was occurring in Nicaragua as opposed to El Salvador. Id., para.
160.
30

See, e.g., Jennings Dissenting Opinion, Nicaragua Judgment, supra note 17, at 544 (“it
seems dangerous to define unnecessarily strictly the conditions for lawful self-defence, so as to
leave a large area where both a forcible response to force is forbidden, and yet the United Nations
employment of force, which was intended to fill that gap, is absent.”).
31

THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMEN TARY , supra note 25, at 801
(commentary by Professor Albrecht Randelzhofer that “[t]aking into consideration modern
practice of international terrorism, today I am of the opinion that the statement of the ICJ is much
too sweeping. . . and needs further differentiation. Otherwise it would lead to the result that
States are not sufficiently protected by Article 51 of the Charter against force committed by other
states in an indirect manner, thus eroding the very purpose of the Charter. ”); ROSALYN HIGGINS,
PROBLEMS AND PROCESS : INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT 250-51 (1994) (“That
finding has occasioned a torrent of criticism, the critics contending that it is an encouragement
for low-grade terrorism because the state at whom it is directed cannot use self-defence against
it.”).

11
the Court (per Nicaragua) apparently does not regard the provision of weapons or logistical support
(for example, the use of communications facilities) by the first state to the non-state actor as resulting
in imputation, nor regards imputation as arising by the first state simply tolerating the presence of
the non-state actor.32 In the event that the first state lacked capacity to stop the non-state actor, and
was unwilling to receive assistance from the second state in stopping the non-state actor (perhaps
for internal political reasons), Nicaragua implies that this, too, apparently would be a situation where
the non-state actor’s conduct could not be imputed to the first state.
If this is what the Court means by “imputed” in its advisory opinion, then the upshot of the
Court’s present jurisprudence appears to be that under the UN Charter (1) a state may provide
weapons, logistical support, and safe haven to a terrorist group; (2) that group may then inflict
violence on another state of any level of gravity, even with weapons of mass destruction; (3) the
second state has no right to respond in self-defense against the first state because the first state’s
provision of such assistance is not an “armed attack” within the meaning of Article 51; and (4) the
second state has no right to respond in self-defense against the terrorist group because its conduct
cannot be imputed to the first state, absent a showing that first state “sent” the terrorist group on its
mission. Such a legal construct, if intended, seems unlikely to endure.
A conceivable explanation might be that the requirement of “necessity” embedded within
Article 51 as a matter of customary international law requires that, before resorting to self-defense,
a state must satisfy itself that the state in which the non-state actor is located is unwilling or unable
to take steps necessary to remove the threat caused by the non-state actor. Under this interpretation,
32

By analogy, it would seem that the second state also could not engage in “counterintervention” against the first state (in other words, could not take measures that intervene in the
first state’s internal affairs that fall short of a use of force).

12
the finding would not be that Article 51 “has no relevance” to self-defense against an attack by a
non-state actor but, rather, that the necessity of defending cannot be established if there is still a
possibility that another state could terminate the threat. Such an interpretation would be consistent
with other decisions of the Court regarding the exercise of self-defense, which at times have asked
whether there were peaceful alternatives available, such as pursuing diplomatic efforts.33 But under
such a position, the focus is less on whether a prior armed attack can be imputed to a state, than on
whether that state is capable of preventing further attacks and is willing to do so.34 In the context of
the Court’s consideration of Israel’s conduct, it is unclear why this standard of necessity is not met.
Either there is no other state capable of, or willing to, end the terrorist attacks against Israel, or there
is such a “state” in the form of the nascent Palestine that, despite repeated efforts of the Israeli
government, has proven unwilling or unable to end such attacks.
State practice under Article 51. Third, whatever might have been the original meaning of

33

See, e.g., Oil Platforms Judgment, supra note 18, at para. 76 (“In this connection, the
Court notes that there is no evidence that the United States complained to Iran of the military
activities of the platforms, . . . which does not suggest that the targeting of the platforms was seen
as a necessary act.”)
34

That approach would be consistent with the Court’s decision in the Corfu Channel
case, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Merits), which notes “every State’s obligation not to knowingly allow its
territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states.” In that case, the Court never
established who had laid the mines that damaged the U.K. warships; rather, it placed an
evidentiary burden on Albania to disprove its involvement given Albania’s control over the
territory in which the mines were laid. When Albania did not do so, the Court held that Albania
was responsible. Such an obligation is embedded more generally in the doctrine of sic utere tuo
ut alienum non laedas (one must use his own so as not to injure others), which in turn has
strongly influenced developments in the field of international environmental law. See Trail
Smelter Case, 3 R.I.A.A. 1911; Rio de Janeiro Declaration on Environment and Development,
principal 2, UN Doc. A/CONF.151/5 (1992), reprinted in 31 ILM 874 (1992).

13
Article 51, subsequent state practice35 appears to support the ability to respond in self-defense to an
attack by a non-state actor, just as occurred in the Caroline incident. The most dramatic example of
invoking Article 51 in response to the attack of a non-state actor arose with respect to the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. The next day, the Security Council passed Resolution 1368, which
affirmed—in the context of such terrorist attacks—“the inherent right of individual and collective
self-defense in accordance with the Charter” and the need “to combat by all means” the “threats to
international peace and security caused by terrorist acts.”36 Shortly thereafter, similar language
appeared in Security Council Resolution 1373.37
There is certainly no language in these resolutions indicating a belief by the Security Council
that terrorist acts must first be imputed to a state in order to trigger a right of self-defense under
Article 51. Indeed, as of September 12, the United States had made no claim that the September 11
attacks were to be imputed to any particular state, nor did the Secretary-General or any of the
Security Council members make such an assumption.38 This practice by the Security Council
presumably should have been probative for the Court’s Article 51 finding in the Israeli Wall opinion
since, when interpreting the UN Charter previously, the Court has regarded relevant state practice

35

Subsequent practice by states in the application of a treaty is regarded as relevant in
some circumstances for purposes of interpreting the treaty. See VCLT, supra note 11, Art.
31(3)(b), 1155 UNTS at 340.
36

SC Res. 1368, pmbl. (Sept. 12, 2001).

37

SC Res. 1373, pmbl. (Sept. 28, 2001).

38

See, e.g., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4370 at 2 (Sept. 12, 2001) (statement by Secretary General
that “[a]ll of us condemn [the attack] and those who planned it—whoever they may be—in the
strongest possible terms.”).

14
as including actions of states when operating as members of a UN organ.39 As Judge Kooijmans
noted in his separate opinion:

Resolutions 1368 and 1373 recognize the inherent right of individual or collective selfdefence without making any reference to an armed attack by a State. . . . This new element
is not excluded by the terms of Article 51 since [Article 51] conditions the exercise of the
inherent right of self-defence on a previous armed attack without saying that this armed
attack must come from another State even if this has been the generally accepted
interpretation for more than 50 years. The Court has regrettably by-passed this new element,
the legal implications of which cannot as yet be assessed but which marks undeniably a new
approach to the concept of self-defence.40

The Security Council’s interpretation of the meaning of Article 51 in respect of a non-state
39

See, e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971
I.C.J. 16, 22 (June 21) (using such practice to interpret the voting requirements of UN Charter
article 27(3)); Competence of the General Assembly for Admission of a State to the United
Nations, 1950 I.C.J. 4, 9 (Mar. 3) (looking to the practice of the Security Council and General
Assembly when interpreting UN Charter provisions on admission of states to the United
Nations).
40

See Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion,
supra note 4, para. 35 (emphasis added); see also THOMAS M. FRANCK , RECOURSE TO FORCE :
STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED ATTACKS 54 (2002) (Resolution 1368 “clearly
confirms the right of victim states to treat terrorism as an armed attack . . .”); Gray, supra note
20, at 165 (“[I]t seems clear from the international reaction at the time that the members of the
Security Council were in fact willing to accept the use of force in self-defence by the USA in
response to the terrorist attacks.”); Antonio Cassese, Terrorism is Also Disrupting Some Crucial
Legal Categories of International Law, 12 EJIL 993, 996 (2001) (finding that the “events of 11
September have dramatically altered the [self-defense] legal framework”).

15
threat appears to have been shared by all the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization41
and of the Organization of American States.42 In viewing the September 11 incident as an “attack”
triggering collective defense obligations, neither alliance asserted that responsibility for the incidents
must first be imputed to a foreign state.43 Thereafter, on October 7, the United States notified the UN
Security Council in accordance with Article 51 that the United States was deploying forces into
Afghanistan in the exercise of its inherent right of self-defense.44

41

On September 12, 2001, the North Atlantic Council agreed that, if it was determined
that the September 11 incidents were directed from abroad against the United States, “it shall be
regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed
attack against one or more of the Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack
against them all.” NATO Press Release No. 124, Statement by the North Atlantic Council (Sept.
12, 2001), <http://www.nato.int>; see North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, Art. 5, 63 Stat. 2241,
34 UNTS 243 (expressly referring to the exercise of self-defense “recognized by Article 51 of”
the UN Charter). On October 2, after being briefed on the known facts by the United States, the
North Atlantic Council determined that it was “clear and compelling” that “the attack against the
United States on 11 September was directed from abroad and shall therefore be regarded as an
action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty . . . .” NATO, Statement by NATO
Secretary General Lord Robertson (Oct. 2, 2001), <http://www.nato.int>. Even at this stage, there
was no attribution by NATO of the attacks to a foreign state.
42

O.A.S. Doc. RC.24/RES.1/01, OEA/Ser.F/II.24 (Sept. 21, 2001) (resolution of OAS
ministers of foreign affairs that “these terrorist attacks against the United States of America are
attacks against all American states” triggering the reciprocal assistance provisions under the Rio
Treaty).
43

As Malcolm Shaw notes, “[a]ccordingly, the members of both these alliances accepted
that what happened on 11 September constituted an armed attack within the meaning of Article
51 of the Charter.” SHAW, supra note 20, at 1028. The reactions of NATO and the OAS may be
of particular interest, in that Article 51 was incorporated into the Charter at the 1945 San
Francisco conference principally as a means of accommodating the resort to self-defense by
regional organizations. See IAN BROWNLIE , INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES 270 (1963).
44

The United States did assert that Al Qaeda was “supported by the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan” and that the attacks were “made possible by the decision of the Taliban regime to
allow the parts of Afghanistan that it controls to be used by [Al Qaeda] as a base of operation.”
Letter dated 7 October 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America

16
The Court’s only effort to address Security Council resolutions 1368 and 1373 comes in the
second part of its Article 51 finding. The Court states that those resolutions are not relevant because
“the threat which [Israel] regards as justifying the construction of the wall originates within, and not
outside,” territory under Israeli occupation. The implication of this finding is that, in the case of the
September 11 attacks, the threat originated outside territory under U.S. control, and therefore the
Security Council resolutions concerned a situation different that faced by Israel. Why such a factual
difference is material for the application of Article 51, however, is left unexplained by the Court.
Moreover, why the Court saw a factual difference between September 11 and the attacks against
Israel is also not obvious. The September 11 attacks were committed by nineteen men resident in the
United States by seizing aircrafts in the United States and crashing them into buildings in the United
States.45 In at least an immediate sense, the threat “originated” in territory under U.S. control.46 The
nineteen men did receive training, instructions, and funds from outside the United States (although
even today the issue of funding remains cloudy), but the Court does not explain why that constitutes
a threat originating outside the United States. Conversely, while the Court states without citation that

to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/2001/946
(Oct. 7, 2001).Yet there is nothing in the U.S. report to the Security Council, nor in the views of
other states at the time, reflecting a belief that imputation of the attacks to the state of
Afghanistan was necessary prior to acting upon such a right of self-defense. See GRAY, supra
note 20, at 166 (“Both [the United States and United Kingdom] thus left uncertain what degree of
involvement, if any, by Afghanistan was necessary to justify the use of force against its
territory.”)
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See generally THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT : FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (2004) (providing an account
of the events leading up to and including the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001).
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The Court spoke of where the terrorist threat originated, whereas Judge Kooijmans
spoke of where the terrorist acts originated. Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, para. 36,
Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion, supra note 4 (emphasis added).
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Israel itself regards the threat against it as originating within occupied territory,47 Israel clearly stated
to the Court in its written submission that the terrorist attacks had significant foreign connections.
Israel identified four principal Palestinian terrorist organizations, and described attacks committed
by each group against Israel. Israel stated that one of them, the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, “receives logistical support from, and safe haven in, Syria,”48 while another, Palestine
Islamic Jihad, “receives support, sponsorship and safe haven from Syria, Lebanon and Iran . . . .”49
The Court left unexplained why such support nevertheless means that the threat to Israel only
originated in territory under Israeli control.
Any assumption that these two Security Council resolutions alone are the only relevant state
practice—and Judge Kooijman’s view that prior to 2001 there was a “generally accepted”
interpretation of Article 51 calling for only self-defense against state action50—would be debatable
and would merit further explanation. Although not always cast in terms of a right of self-defense,
some state practice since 1945 evinces a belief that states may act against non-state actors in the
exercise of a right of protection against threats, such as against stateless vessels on the high seas. For
example, in 1985, U.S. military aircraft intercepted an Egyptian aircraft over the Mediterranean Sea
and forced it to land in Italy so that alleged terrorists on board the craft could be seized and
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Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, para. 139.
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Written Statement of Israel, para. 3.59 (Jan. 29, 2004), Legal Consequences Advisory
Opinion, supra note 4.
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Id., para. 3.61.

Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, para. 35, Legal Consequences Advisory
Opinion, supra note 4.
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prosecuted.51 While such actions occur outside the territory of any state and therefore may be
distinguishable from typical situations of self-defense by a state, arguably those precedents are of
particular relevance with respect to the West Bank and Gaza strip, areas not regarded at present as
formally within the territory of any recognized state. Moreover, there are various incidents of
practice prior to September 11 in which self-defense was invoked against non-state actors operating
within foreign states, whether they be terrorists or insurgents that threaten the defending states. The
United States, Israel, and South Africa have all invoked a right of self-defense to enter the territory
of other states to attack terrorist camps or other facilities.52 Similar invocations of Article 51 may be
found when states have attacked insurgents by crossing into neighboring states, such as Senegal’s
incursion into Guinea-Bissau, Thailand’s incursion into Myanmar (Burma), and Tajikistan’s
incursion into Afghanistan, all in the 1990’s.
Whether such practice evinces an emergent norm under Article 51 requires serious analysis
of such incidents, including the legal justification stated by the allegedly defending state and the
response of the global community to that justification. Many scholars view such incidents as
unlawful deviations from the jus ad bellum,53 while others detect an emerging norm in response to
51

For a discussion of the Achille Lauro affair, see ANTONIO CASSESE , TERRORISM ,
POLITICS AND THE LAW : THE ACHILLE LAURO AFFAIR (S.J.K. Greenleaves trans., 1989).
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Invoking a right of self-defense under Article 51, Israel crossed into the Sinai in 1956
in pursuit of Palestinian terrorists and attacked Palestinian camps in Lebanon during 1970-83 and
in Tunisia in 1985. During 1976-85, South Africa attacked camps of the Southwest Africa
People’s Organization (SWAPO) in Angola, and made similar raids into Lesotho, Swaziland, and
Zambia.
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See, e.g., CASSESE , supra note 51, at 66-67 (finding the 1985 interception of the aircraft
containing the Achille Lauro terrorists unjustifiable under Article 51); Cassese, supra note 38, at
996 (finding that a majority of states prior to September 11 did not accept recourse to selfdefense by the targeting terrorist bases in a host country).
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the rise in global terrorist activity. Thus, Thomas Franck suggests there may be emerging in the
Security Council and General Assembly “a greater tolerance for states that carry their wars with
terrorists and insurgents across borders to strike at safe havens.”54
An example of that tolerance may be seen with respect to the 1998 Al-Qaeda-sponsored
bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, which killed nearly
300 people (including twelve Americans). The United States invoked its “right of self-defense
confirmed by Article 51”55 and launched cruise missiles against training camps in Afghanistan and
against a Sudanese pharmaceutical plant allegedly serving as a chemical weapons facility. Perhaps
the U.S. attacks were unlawful, but the global reaction to the attacks suggests a measure of
acceptance. While some states condemned the attacks, others supported them, including Australia,
France, Germany, Japan, Spain, and the United Kingdom.56 Neither the General Assembly nor the
Security Council condemned the attacks. The League of Arab States condemned the attack on the
Sudan, but was silent regarding the attack on Afghanistan.57 Perhaps the U.S. attacks were lawful
because Al Qaeda’s conduct was “imputed” to the Sudan and Afghanistan. If so, that would suggest
a fairly broad (and perhaps meaningless) standard for finding “imputation” of conduct. No Sudanese
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55

Letter Dated 20 August 1998 from the Permanent Representative of the United States
of America to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN Doc.
S/1998/780 (1998).
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See William Drozdiak, European Allies Back U.S. Strikes: Japan Says It
“Understands,” WASH . POST , Aug. 21, 1998, at A20.
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Doc. S/1998/789 (1998).
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or Afghan government organs were involved in the attacks on the U.S. embassies, or controlled or
directed such attacks, and neither government acknowledged and adopted the attacks as their own.
The most that the United States could claim was that it had made “repeated efforts to convince the
Government of the Sudan and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan to shut these terrorist activities
down . . . .”58
The tolerance of such cross-border incursions, however, likely has less to do with the idea
of imputing conduct to a state, and more with the objectionable conduct arising with some
consistency in an identifiable territory outside the territory of the victim-state.

It is becoming clear that a victim-state may invoke Article 51 to take armed
countermeasures in accordance with international law and UN practice against any territory
harboring, supporting or tolerating activities that culminate in, or are likely to give rise to,
insurgent infiltrations or terrorist attack. That much is becoming cognizable as applicable
law.59

Under such a standard, Israel is entitled as a legal matter to invoke Article 51 as the basis for acts
against terrorist attacks from outside Israel’s borders although, of course, it might be established as
a factual matter that the terrorist attacks were not grave enough to trigger a right of self-defense, or
that Israel’s response was unnecessary or disproportionate.
Article 51's negotiating history. Fourth, if resort to the travaux préparatoires of the UN
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FRANCK , supra note 40, at 67.
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Charter is appropriate,60 it reveals some evidence that Article 51 was not limited to self-defense by
states against other states. The drafts of what became Article 51 were initially developed within the
delegation of the host country for the San Francisco Conference, the United States. The early U.S.
drafts on May 10-11, 1945, contained language that recognized the right of a member state to defend
against an attack by another state.61 Such limiting language was then dropped in the course of
accommodating U.K. and French concerns, even though in doing so the U.S. delegation noted that
it “opened very widely the field for the exercise of the right of self-defense.”62 The accommodation
was not focused on allowing states to defend against non-state actors; it was prompted by a desire
to ensure that states could self-defend even in the absence of a regional arrangement. Nevertheless,
the language was changed so as to broaden the scope of the right of self-defense recognized under
Article 51, with no state insisting on the retention of language that would restrict self-defense to
attacks only by other states.

60

The Court reverted to the travaux préparatoires of the 1949 Geneva Conventions in the
course of its advisory opinion. See Legal Consequences Advisory Opinion, supra note 4, para.
95. Treaty interpretation, however, only calls for recourse to the travaux if the initial
interpretation leads to an ambiguous or obscure meaning, or to an absurd or unreasonable result.
See VCLT, supra note 11, Art. 32, 1155 UNTS at 340. Further, there is some authority for the
proposition that, when interpreting the text of the constitution of an international
organization—such as the UN Charter—the original intention of the drafters of the constitution
should not be emphasized, since the parties may increase or change, and because such a
constitution, by its nature, should not be viewed as static. See, e.g., Certain Expenses of the
United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter), 1962 ICJ 151, 185 (July 20) (separate
opinion of Judge Spender).
61

See Timothy Kearley, Regulation of Preventive and Preemptive Force in the United
Nations Charter: A Search for Original Intent, 3 WYOMING L. REV . 663, 693, 695-97, 699-700
(2003).
62

Id. at 702-05 (quoting U.S. delegate Harold Stassen).

22
II. FACTS AND THE JUS AD BELLUM

The Palestinian delegation to the Court did not urge the Court to find that Article 51 was
inapplicable because it only concerns a state attacking another state. Rather, Palestine’s arguments
were more sophisticated: (1) the acts of violence committed against Israel did not rise in gravity to
the level of being an “armed attack” within the meaning of Article 51;63 (2) since Article 51 does not
allow self-defense against a future armed attack, the construction of the “wall” cannot be justified
as a means of preventing such an armed attack;64 (3) self-defense under Article 51 must be
proportionate to the actual or imminent harm, and the construction of the “wall” is not;65 and (4)
Israel’s rights to use force within the occupied territory are governed exclusively by the jus in bello
as lex specialis, such that any rights existing under Article 51 are displaced and cannot be invoked.66
To consider and dispose of these arguments, the Court would have had to grapple with the
facts associated with Israel’s assertion that it was the victim of repeated terrorist attacks. The Court
could not find that those attacks failed to rise to a level of an “armed attack” without systematically
reviewing the nature and gravity of the terrorist attacks against Israel. The Court could not find that
Israel was acting in preemptive self-defense without determining that an “armed attack” had not yet
occurred by virtue of the thousands of Israelis that Israel told the Court were killed and injured over
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(Feb. 23, 2004) (statement of Professor Georges Abi-Saab).
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the past four years.67 The Court could not assess whether the construction of a barrier was a
proportionate response to the threat of attack without engaging in a serious review of Israel’s
allegations about that threat.
The final Palestinian argument that the jus ad bellum (including Article 51) is set aside in
occupied territory may or may not be correct as a legal matter. Many scholars see a linkage between
the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello (such as with respect to their respective use of customary rules
on necessity and proportionality) without seeing one body of law as wholly displacing the other.68As
a hierarchical matter, rights and obligations arising under the UN Charter would seem to trump those
arising in the Hague Regulations or Geneva Conventions, or for that matter in human rights
conventions.69 To the extent that the Court had viewed Article 51 as displaced by (or perhaps
subsumed within) the jus in bello—or had simply found that a state in exercising a right of selfdefense must always comply with the jus in bello—then the Court could have completely avoided
issuing its dubious interpretation of Article 51. Yet the Court still would have needed to confront
much more directly the myriad aspects of the jus in bello which accord to a belligerent—including
an occupying power— the ability to defend itself, and to apply the facts on the ground to that law.
For example, the Court would have needed to grapple with Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, which provides that the occupying power may take “measures of control and security
as may be necessary as a result of the war.” Such measures may include, according to the Pictet
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commentary, “prohibition of access to certain areas” or “restrictions of movement.”70
As it happened, the Court’s opinion reveals no effort to consider any of the facts that might
have justified Israeli defensive measures, even to discount those facts as inadequate. The Court’s jus
in bello analysis, along with its discussion of human rights law, recounts in some detail (to the point
of repeated reference to statistics) the harm to the Palestinian people from the construction of the
barrier, but evinces no analysis whatsoever of the threat that, according to Israel, justified the
creation of the barrier. The Court simply makes two vague statements that, “in light of the material
before it,” the Court “is not convinced” that Israel’s actions were necessary,71 and finds that the
barrier “could well become permanent” (notwithstanding Israel’s assurance that it would not), and
thus was unlawful.72 But why was the Court not convinced that Israel’s actions were necessary? What
facts raised by Israel in its Written Statement—or in any of the numerous Israeli reports and
statements to the United Nations over the past four years—did the Court find unconvincing? Did the
Court believe that terrorist attacks were not occurring, or that they were occurring but not at a level
sufficient to justify construction of a barrier, or that a barrier was justified but that the route selected
by Israel was not tailored narrowly to address the threat? And exactly what “material” was the Court
looking at in reaching its sweeping statements? It is no surprise that Judge Buergenthal, in his
70

ICRC COMMENTARY PUBLISHED UNDER THE GENERAL EDITORSHIP OF JEAN S. PICTET,
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dissenting declaration, called the Court to task for failing “to ascertain all relevant facts bearing
directly on issues of Israel’s legitimate right of self-defence, military necessity and security needs,
given the repeated deadly attacks in and upon Israel proper coming from the Occupied Palestinian
Territory to which Israel has been and continues to be subjected . . . .”73
The Court may have failed to confront these facts from a belief that such facts were not
before it. The principal sources of information relied upon by the Court appear to have been an
eleven-page report by the Secretary-General74 and a fifteen-page report of a Special Rapporteur of
the Commission on Human Rights,75 plus a dossier of materials compiled for the Court by the
Secretary-General.76 Neither report undertook a serious factual analysis of the terrorist threat to
Israel, or whether a barrier was a necessary and proportionate response to that threat. The SecretaryGeneral’s report stated that the Israeli cabinet approved the construction of the “wall” after “a sharp
rise in Palestinian terror attacks in the spring of 2002,” and devoted two sentences in an annex to
Israeli victims from suicide bombers entering Israel from the West Bank,77 but did not recount any
other facts relating to such attacks, nor whether the “wall” would likely stem the attacks. The Special
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Rapporteur’s report simply stated that “[p]ossibly, the Wall will assist in the achievement of the
Government’s publicly declared goal—to prevent suicide bombers from reaching Israeli territory,”
but that this is “doubted by some.”78 The lack of attention to such issues is no fault of the reporters;
their mandate was not to analyze factually or legally Israel’s right of self-defense but, rather, to report
on whether Israel was stopping construction of and dismantling the “wall” (the Secretary-General’s
report) or on whether there were violations of human rights in the “Occupied Arab Territories” (the
special rapporteur’s report). The dossier prepared by the Secretary-General also contained no
documents directed specifically at informing the Court regarding Israel’s claim of self-defense,
although some verbatim records of meetings before the General Assembly and the Security Council
touched upon the issue,79 particularly those containing Israel’s representations.80
Of course many facts relating to Israel’s arguments regarding the need for a barrier were
readily available in the public domain, as the Court itself acknowledged.81 In addition to Israel’s
myriad statements before United Nations,82 the Israeli Foreign Ministry had issued various
statements regarding terrorist attacks on Israel and the need for such a barrier to stem those attacks,
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including statistics on attacks and the effectiveness against terrorism of a similar barrier constructed
around the Gaza Strip.83 In these statements and in various proceedings before Israeli courts, the
Israeli government argued that the placement of the barrier, depending on the location, was driven
by various concerns, such as population density, environmental effects, topography (for example,
the need to allow for adequate observation from the barrier’s patrol road), providing sufficient time
to locate persons who have crossed the barrier before they can reach an area of safe refuge, and
minimization of harm to cultivated farmland (for example, placing the barrier along an existing
road).84 At the same time, the Court could have considered Israeli government documents that were
adverse to its position. The Israeli Knesset “watchdog” comptroller’s office found in July 2002 that,
since the beginning of the second intifada in 2000, most of the suicide terrorists and the car bombs
crossed the “green line” into Israel through porous checkpoints, suggesting that strengthening of
existing checkpoints rather than construction of a new barrier was the necessary response.85 In its
83
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advisory opinion, the Court made no explicit reference to such statements, nor to the widely-known
history of Israel’s vulnerability in the Middle East, which has entailed repeated armed conflicts with
neighbors and an enduring exposure to terrorist attack, particularly since the second intifada broke
out.
One might argue that the Court is not in a position to pull together such information on its
own, but the Court does have mechanisms at its disposal for independent fact-finding.86 In one of
the first cases to come before the Court—one that involved important factual questions on the use
of military force—the Court appointed a committee of three experts to make an independent study
of the facts in dispute between the two parties.87 After receiving a first report from the committee,
the Court instructed the committee to conduct an on-site visit to verify and, if necessary, modify its
findings. The committee then provided a second report to the Court, and the Court held a session for
the purpose of the judges asking questions directly to the committee members.88 The same avenue
86
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lay open to the Court in this advisory opinion.89
Since Israel’s written statement to the Court—which focused on whether the General
Assembly’s question was properly before the Court—did not engage in a systematic analysis of the
facts relating to the threat to Israel, nor why the a barrier was a necessary and proportionate response
to that threat, it might be argued that there was no need for the Court to undertake one. If so, then
Israel’s failure to plead in detail on this issue may have led the Court to adopt sub silentio a certain
burden90 or presumption91 against Israel’s position. However, while resort to such a burden or
presumption might be appropriate in the context of a contentious case before the Court, doing so in
an advisory opinion is dubious. The Court’s statute is quite clear that in contentious cases, the failure
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of a party to defend its case may result in a finding by the Court in favor of a claimant state,92 but no
such provision exists in the advisory opinion context. Unlike in a contentious case, Israel was under
no obligation to file any pleadings with the Court, written or oral, let alone address particular factual
issues in those pleadings. As Shabtai Rosenne notes, “since there are normally no ‘parties’ in
advisory cases, the role of the States and of international organizations is—or should be—limited
to that of an amicus curiae nature.”93 In such circumstances, there does not appear to be any basis
for reaching factual conclusions based on a failure of Israel to present facts to the Court. Perhaps the
subject matter of the advisory opinion looked similar to that of a contentious case, but the Court
itself characterized the matter before it as one that was not bilateral in nature and one that had a
“much broader frame of reference than a bilateral dispute.”94 Moreover, in the Permanent Court’s
Eastern Carelia advisory opinion, the Court refused to answer the question in part because the Court
found that Russia’s refusal to take part in the case meant that the Court would not have before it the
materials necessary to arrive at a judicial conclusion on the questions of fact;95 the Court was not of
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the view that it could simply find against Russia based on a failure to produce such materials.
A second reason why the Court declined to engage in such a factual analysis may be that it
is institutionally ill-equipped to do so. Whether sitting under its contentious or advisory jurisdiction,
the Court operates as a court of first instance, called upon to decide difficult issues of international
law at the same time that it must develop and test a detailed factual record. The Court may or may
not receive assistance from states in developing that record, but even if it does, the Court has few
means for testing evidence and for resolving direct conflicts between evidence. Witness testimony
is possible, but discouraged by the Court, which seems uncomfortable when operating outside the
stolid environment of government lawyers or familiar academics making scripted presentations. The
judges rarely ask questions of the states who appear before it, and when they do, the responses
virtually never entail presentation of additional evidence. As noted above, there are some
mechanisms available to the Court for independent fact-finding, but the Court has fallen into a habit
of not resorting to such mechanisms, in part because states typically prefer to keep control of the
evidence placed before the Court. If detailed factual findings are later proven wrong, the Court’s
reputation will suffer, such that there are benefits to reaching vague factual conclusions, even if this,
too, has reputational consequences. In reaching its decisions, the Court must cope with the
potentially differing views of fifteen judges (sometimes more if additional ad hoc judges are
appointed), and in trying to achieve a great a consensus as possible, findings on both fact and law
often appear to be watered down or anodyne.
While these difficulties are problematic in any case where there are factual disagreements
between states who come before the Court, they become especially so when dealing with jus ad
bellum issues. Judgments concerning the jus ad bellum can strike at the heart of states’ national

32
security interests, and determining whether states have engaged in an unlawful use of force or lawful
self-defense often will require especially careful and sophisticated analysis of state conduct where
relevant evidence is conflicting, secretive, and confusing. The stakes are high for the states who are
implicated in the Court’s finding, so much so that states may resist appearing before the Court, such
as occurred in the merits phase of the Nicaragua case and, to a certain extent, in this advisory
opinion. Moreover, the stakes are high for the Court as well; labeling a state as an aggressor is
serious business, and could lead to further conflict if not handled carefully. Though the Court has
addressed jus ad bellum issues only rarely, so far the Court appears extremely reluctant to find that
a resort to military force is lawful. While it is possible that, by self-selection, the only cases that
come before the Court are those where the alleged use of force is unlawful, it may also be that the
judges of the Court are simply uncomfortable indicating that any use of force is lawful, and instead
believe that states should always find means to resolve disputes pacifically.
One way around these institutional difficulties in dealing with facts would be for the Court,
at least when rendering advisory opinions relating to the jus ad bellum, to focus on legal
interpretations and stay away from application of the law to facts. While the Court claimed that it
was engaged in an analysis no different than it had undertaken in the past, such as in the Nuclear
Weapons advisory opinion,96 in fact the Court was going well beyond the abstract legal analysis that
has characterized most of its advisory opinions so as to apply the legal analysis in a very sweeping
fashion to a complicated set of fact-based issues. The Court was not opining broadly on a legal
question without reference to any particular state’s conduct (such as the status of nuclear weapons
under international law), nor narrowly applying the law to a very discrete set of legal facts (such as
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the commencement of lawsuits against a UN special rapporteur). Instead, the Court was opining
broadly on the permissibly of a barrier extending hundreds of kilometers without any consideration
of whether placement of the barrier was permissible in some areas (due to security considerations
and minimal effects on civilians) while in other areas it was not.
If the Court was unwilling or incapable of analyzing and deciding upon such a complex fact
pattern, it would have been much better for the Court to have avoided an Article 51 analysis entirely,
such as by finding that a state in exercising a right of self-defense must always comply with the jus
in bello. If the Court had to address the jus ad bellum, the Court should have either considered and
discussed in detail the facts relating to Israel’s position for why it was engaging in self-defense, or
should have written its advisory opinion so as to set forth the legal framework relevant to this issue
without definitively applying the framework to the facts.97
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An advisory opinion simply discussing the jus ad bellum legal framework might have
found that: (1) construction of a barrier within one’s own territory along a border does not violate
the jus ad bellum; (2) construction of a barrier in occupied territory as a general matter violates
the necessity prong of the jus ad bellum, but might be justified as a matter of self-defense if there
is a threat to the occupying power that rises to a level of an “armed attack,” and if the barrier is a
necessary and proportionate response to that threat; (3) in the context of a threat from terrorist
suicide bombers, an “armed attack” only arises when [the threat can be imputed to a foreign
state] [the threat originates from outside the occupied territory] [the threat has a gravity
comparable to a large-scale use of force by a state] [other] ; (4) in the context of such an “armed
attack,” a barrier is necessary only if there is no other alternative means of addressing the attack
and is proportionate only if the barrier is designed in a manner that is directed at the threat and no
other objective; and (5) the Court does not have before it sufficient facts to apply these principles
to the construction of the Israeli barrier. Of course, such an approach may have had a collateral
effect on the ability of the Court to reach definitive factual conclusions regarding the jus in bello
as well.
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III. CONCLUSION
Judge Higgins’ lament regarding the Court’s analysis of the jus in bello seems equally
applicable to its analysis of the jus ad bellum: “It might have been expected that an advisory opinion
would have contained a detailed analysis, by reference to the texts, the voluminous literature and the
facts at the Court’s disposal, as to”98 why Israel could not invoke Article 51. “Such an approach
would have followed the tradition of using advisory opinions as an opportunity to elaborate and
develop international law.”99 Likewise, Judge Buergenthal’s lament regarding the Court’s
unwillingness to pursue serious factual analysis relating to the jus ad bellum is fully justified.
The Court would do well to heed these concerns. The Court currently has on its docket a
series of cases relevant to the jus ad bellum, including those brought by Serbia for the NATO attacks
relating to Kosovo, and those of the Democratic Republic of the Congo against Rwanda and Uganda.
They are opportunities for the Court not only to decide concrete cases, but to help clarify in a cogent
and thoughtful way the status of international law in its most critical area. States are only willing to
yield power to an international court of fifteen individuals when they believe that the court’s findings
reflect higher levels of deliberation than exist within any one state’s machinery. Peremptory findings
that lack deep levels of reasoning, that fail to take account of and to rebut divergent lines of thinking,
are not salutary qualities for any court, let alone one that holds itself out as the “supreme arbiter of
international legality”.100
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